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In mid-April, deputy trade ministers from around the Americas met to prepare the agenda for the
next hemispheric trade ministers' conference, to take place May 13-16 in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. At
the upcoming conference, delegates are scheduled to unveil an agreed-upon strategy to forge the
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Nevertheless, in the preparatory meetings, the deputy
ministers have been unable to agree on even the basic tenets of negotiations, reflecting deep
disagreements between the US and some large Latin American countries about how fast to allow the
FTAA to move forward.
Since the US government hosted the first Summit of the Americas in Miami in December 1995,
Latin America's trade ministers have met twice to review progress in constructing the FTAA. At
those conferences, the ministers authorized the creation of 12 technical commissions to review the
specific aspects of the FTAA that must be worked out when formal negotiations begin. They also
designated their deputies to supervise progress in the technical discussions (see NotiSur , 07/06/95
and 03/28/96).
The deputy ministers, in turn, have met frequently to review the work of the subcommissions
and to hammer out the general framework for FTAA negotiations. At the latest deputy ministers'
conference April 14-17 in Rio de Janeiro, the delegates hoped to finalize all pre-accords regarding
the strategy and time frame for constructing the FTAA. The framework for negotiations would then
be approved at the May conference, paving the way to open formal negotiations before the next
Summit of the Americas, scheduled for March 1998 in Santiago, Chile.
Nevertheless, the mid-April conference revealed major disagreements among the delegations,
making it unlikely that an accord will be announced when the ministers meet. "Since the
presidential summit in Miami, the goal of all our governments has been to announce the framework
and agenda for negotiations at the Belo Horizonte conference this year," said Sebastian do Rego
Barros, secretary general of Brazil's Foreign Ministry. "But there are fundamental differences among
our proposals that will be extremely difficult to reconcile prior to the ministers' conference. We may
not even be able to work out those disagreements before next year."
US and MERCOSUR clash over pace of negotiations
The deputy ministers did reach some important agreements in April. The most noteworthy is that,
regardless of whether all agenda details are worked out in advance, the next presidential summit in
Santiago must mark the start of formal FTAA talks. In addition, they agreed that all negotiations to
form the free-trade zone must conclude by 2005, at the latest.
The deputy ministers also agreed to base all decisions during negotiations on consensus, to make
all clauses in the FTAA compatible with global trade accords negotiated through the World Trade
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Organization (WTO), to include all productive sectors in the FTAA, and to permit subregional trade
accords to continue to exist alongside the hemispheric trade zone once it is formed. Notwithstanding
these accords, the delegations spent most of their time laboring over contrasting proposals
regarding the time frame and agenda for negotiations. Although five proposals are currently on
the bargaining table, two reflect extremely conflicting positions: a proposal by the US, and another
from the four members of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay.
The crux of the conflict is the pace with which the two sides propose to carry out negotiations. The
US wants all aspects of the FTAA to be negotiated simultaneously starting in March 1998, allowing
an accelerated review of the issues. The US goal is to have a functioning free-trade zone in place
by the year 2005, with the implementation of some accords to begin in advance of that date. In
contrast, MERCOSUR wants negotiations that would span the period from 1998-2005, with a final,
comprehensive accord to be signed only at the end of the eight years and no partial implementation
before then.
MERCOSUR proposes a three-stage process: review of conditions for investment and business
development from 1998-2000; examination of customs regulations and the elimination of nontariff
trade barriers from 2000- 2003, and negotiations on market access and tariff reductions from
2003-2005. MERCOSUR wants to consolidate its trade advantage before FTAA MERCOSUR's
gradual approach reflects a strategy by those countries shared to a lesser extent by the Andean
Community (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia) to consolidate free trade in South America
prior to merging their markets with the members of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).
The larger economies, particularly Brazil, hope to gain a major foothold in neighboring markets
before the FTAA takes effect, thus allowing them to better compete with the US after 2005. "Our
goal is not to slow down the process of integration," said Brazil's do Rego Barros. "But we sincerely
believe a gradual approach is best for our economies." Indeed, while negotiations over the FTAA
have languished, integration initiatives in South America headed by MERCOSUR have progressed
with startling speed. Trade among MERCOSUR partners has mushroomed since the common
market began to form, with the sale of goods and services surging in value from about US$3 billion
in 1990 to about US$16 billion by 1996. Last year, MERCOSUR signed accords with Chile and Bolivia
to allow them to become associate members of the common market (see NotiSur, 02/29/96, 03/28/96,
06/14/96, 07/19/96).
And, in late 1996, MERCOSUR and the Andean Community opened negotiations on an eventual
merger, which would convert nearly the entire South American continent into a single free-trade
zone, with the exception of Surinam and Guyana (see NotiSur, 10/04/96). In addition, MERCOSUR
is strengthening its trade ties outside the hemisphere. In 1995, MERCOSUR and the European
Union (EU) signed an agreement in principle to negotiate a free-trade agreement. And, in March,
MERCOSUR and the EU began reviewing plans for a 1998 presidential summit. US steps up
diplomatic efforts to speed negotiations The conflict with MERCOSUR has encouraged the US to
retake the initiative. This year, President Bill Clinton will make two trips to the region, one to Mexico
and Central America in early May, and a second to South America in October. Although Clinton will
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discuss a variety of issues, including drug trafficking and immigration, free-trade negotiations will
be the top priority during both trips.
Perhaps more important, the Clinton administration has renewed its battle in Congress to win
approval for fast-track authority to negotiate new trade accords in the hemisphere, beginning
with Chile. In 1995, the administration shelved its efforts until after the 1996 elections because of
intense domestic opposition to the initiative. Fast track gives the executive much greater authority in
negotiations because it prohibits Congress from altering the contents of a treaty once it is submitted
for legislative approval.
Rather, Congress must vote "yes" or "no" on the entire accord. The administration needs fast-
track authority to win the confidence of Latin America. Chile, for example, refuses to negotiate
its entrance into NAFTA until fast track is approved. In late February, Chilean President Eduardo
Frei visited the US on Clinton's invitation, in large part to help lobby Congress to reconsider
fast track. And, in early April, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretian also visited Washington
for the same purpose. "The lack of fast-track authority leaves us without leadership in our own
hemisphere," warned US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky in testimony to Congress
during her confirmation hearings in January. "If the US is not capable of negotiating broad accords
with other countries, we will be marginalized, while other nations move forward by creating new
economic alliances that favor their own interests." [Sources: Reuter 01/29/97, 03/10/97, 03/27/97,
03/31/97, 04/08/97, 04/11/97; New York Times, 02/04/97, 04/12/97; Inter Press Service, 02/15/97,
04/14/97, 04/17/97; Agence France-Presse, 04/12/97, 04/19/97, 04/21-23/97; The News (Mexico),
04/23/97; Spanish news service EFE, 02/10/97, 02/12/97, 03/10/97, 04/08/97, 04/15/97, 04/18/97,
04/22/97, 04/28/97]
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